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AN INTERPRETATION OF FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES
TROY DAVIG AND ERIC M. LEEPER
Abstract. This paper estimates simple regime-switching rules for monetary policy
and tax policy over the post-war period in the United States and imposes the esti-
mated policy process on a standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
with nominal rigidities. The estimated joint policy process produces a unique sta-
tionary rational expectations equilibrium in a simple New Keynesian model. We
characterize policy impacts across regimes.
Policy regime changes are like the weather: everyone talks about them but few
people do anything about them. This paper does something about them. It estimates
simple Markov-switching rules for monetary policy and tax policy over the post-war
period in the United States. When imposed on a standard dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model with nominal rigidities, the estimated policy process produces a
unique stationary rational expectations equilibrium. In that equilibrium, shocks to
(lump-sum) taxes always aﬀect aggregate demand for reasons articulated by the ﬁscal
theory of thepricelevel. Thepaper’s view that monetary and ﬁscal policies are subject
to on-going ﬂuctuations in regime puts on the table a new interpretation of macro
policies and their impacts over the past six decades.
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1The table is pretty full. Some are purely monetary interpretations of the post-war era, includ-
ing accounts that are narrative [DeLong (1997), Mayer (1998), Romer and Romer (2004)], ﬁxed
regime [Orphanides (2003a)], permanent regime change [Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), Can-
zoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2001), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)], adaptive learning [Cogley and
Sargent (2002a,b), Primiceri (2004), Sargent, Williams, and Zha (2004)], model uncertainty [Cogley
and Sargent (2004)], and regime-switching identiﬁed VARs [Sims and Zha (2004)]. Other work that
integrates monetary and ﬁscal policy includes Leeper and Sims (1994), Romer and Romer (1994),
and Sala (2004).FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 2
Estimated rules separate policy behavior into distinct periods of active and pas-
sive monetary and ﬁscal regimes that accord well with narrative accounts of policy
and with ﬁxed-regime estimates of policy rules.
2 Monetary policy follows a Taylor
(1993) rule and ﬁscal policy adjusts taxes as a function of government debt and other
variables. The estimates uncover periods of active monetary/passive ﬁscal behavior,
the policy mix typically assumed to prevail in monetary studies, along with episodes
of passive monetary/active ﬁscal behavior, the mix associated with the ﬁscal theory
of the price level. Remaining periods combine passive monetary with passive ﬁscal
policy or active monetary with active ﬁscal behavior.
Because simple policy rules that undergo recurring regime changes ﬁt U.S. data
well, it is natural to examine the implications of embedding on-going regime change
in a standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. Conventional ﬁxed-
regime theories, in which regime is permanent and regime change is always a surprise
that ap r i o r iagents believe to be impossible, provide awkward interpretations of
the evidence. By that view, the empirical evidence suggests the economy is lurch-
ing among periods of indeterminacy (passive/passive), non-existence of equilibrium
(active/active), or unique equilibria with completely diﬀerent characteristics (active
monetary/passive ﬁscal or passive monetary/active ﬁscal) [see, for example, Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Sala (2004) for such interpretations].
Our interpretation of policy behavior views the post-war period as one of on-going
regime change. Recognizing that policies change regime according to some probabil-
ity law, private agents embed the stochastic process for regime in their expectation
functions and decision rules. There can exist a unique stationary equilibrium even
though policies can go through periods where both are passive or both are active.
To provide a coherent interpretation of the history of policy behavior, we impose the
estimated policy process directly on an oﬀ-the-shelf model with nominal rigidities,
using a calibration that follows Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). The process gov-
erning regime change and the policy rules estimated from U.S. data produce a unique
stationary equilibrium in that model. In that equilibrium, exogenous disturbances to
monetary and tax policy induce agents to believe that, at initial prices, their wealth
has changed. Responses to perceived changes in wealth determine the impacts of
those shocks. The model implies that
3
2We apply the terminology in Leeper (1991). Active monetary policy is periods when the response
o ft h ei n t e r e s tr a t ei sm o r et h a no n e - f o r - o n et oi n ﬂation and passive monetary policy is periods when
that response is less than one-for-one. Analogously, passive ﬁscal policy occurs when the response of
taxes to debt exceeds the real interest rate and active ﬁscal policy occurs when taxes do not respond
suﬃciently to debt to cover real interest payments. In many models, a unique stationary equilibrium
r e q u i r e so n ea c t i v ea n do n ep a s s i v ep o l i c y .FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 3
• shocks to lump-sum taxes always aﬀect aggregate demand, inﬂation, and out-
put, regardless of the prevailing policy regime;
• i.i.d. tax shocks are propagated for many periods by the Fed’s interest rate
response to inﬂation;
• monetary shocks have conventional short-run impacts, but because theirwealth
eﬀects are not neutralized, their long-run eﬀects can diﬀer in important ways;
• unique stationary equilibriumexists even conditional on active monetary/active
ﬁscal behavior or passive monetary/passive ﬁscal behavior.
A regime-switching setup using an estimated policy process helps to reconcile the
ﬁscal implications of conventional models with the empirical literature that ﬁnds large
aggregate demand eﬀects from tax policy [Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Mountford
and Uhlig (2002), and Perotti (2004)]. Conventional monetary analysis assumes mon-
e t a r yp o l i c yi sa c t i v ea n dﬁscal policy is passive [for example, Woodford (2003)]. With
lump-sum taxes, the conventional policy mix produces Ricardian equivalence. But
taxes are no longer irrelevant when regimes recur and the joint policy process is con-
sistent with U.S. data. It also turns out that the switching environment generates
substantial short-run aggregate demand eﬀects from tax disturbances, an outcome
that Poterba and Summers (1987) argue life-cycle approaches to breaking down Ri-
cardian equivalence cannot produce.
Why treat regime change as recurring? A single piece of legislation set the macro
policy agenda for the post-war era. The Employment Act of 1946 states that it
shall be the goal of the Federal government “to promote maximum employment,
production, and purchasing power.” Stein (1996) characterizes this act as the culmi-
nation of a developing consensus on the objectives of macro policies. No legislation
since then has instructed monetary or ﬁscal authorities to behave diﬀerently. The
Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978, for example, “did nothing at all–save commit the
Federal Reserve chairman to a twice-a-year round of congressional testimony”[DeLong
(1997, p. 271)]. Orphanides (2003a) argues there has been great consistency in the
Fed’s objectives, at least since World War II. Those objectives are summarized in a
1977 amendment to the Federal Reserve Act as being “maximum employment, stable
prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.” Without the creation of new policy
institutions or changes in the legal mandates of existing institutions, there is nothing
to prevent past policy behavior from recurring, and treating changes in policy be-
havior as once-and-for-all reforms is at best a working hypothesis. Constancy of the
overarching macro policy objectives means that regime change, when it occurs, is the
3These results generalize and make empirically relevant the calibrated ﬁndings of Davig, Leeper,
and Chung (2004).FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 4
outgrowth of political pressures and personalities of policy makers–factors that are
temporary and likely to recur. This suggests the alternative working hypothesis of
on-going regime change.4
1. Estimated Policy Rules
We seek empirical characterizations of policy behavior that use simple rules of
the kind appearing in the policy literature, but allow for the possibility of on-going
changes in regime. Monetary and tax policies follow regimes that can switch indepen-
dently of each other. This section reports maximum likelihood estimates of monetary
and ﬁscal rules in which policy regime evolves according to a hidden Markov chain,
as in Hamilton (1989) and Kim and Nelson (1999).
1.1. Speciﬁcations. For monetary policy, we estimate a standard Taylor speciﬁca-
tion, which Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) have shown is nearly optimal in the
class of models we consider in section 2. The rule makes the nominal interest rate,
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t is the monetary policy regime. Regime evolves according to a Markov
chain with transition matrix PM.rand π are net rates. We allow for four states,
with the parameters restricted to take only two sets of values, while variances may
take four diﬀerent values. PM is a 4 × 4 matrix.
Unlike monetary policy, there is no widely accepted simple speciﬁcation for ﬁscal
policy.
5 We model some of the complexity of tax policy with a rule that allows for
the revenue impacts of automatic stabilizers, some degree of pay-as-you-go spending,
and a response to the state of government indebtedness. The rule links revenues net
of transfer payments, τt, to current government purchases, gt, the output gap, and
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4We restrict attention to recurring regime change also for computational and econometric
convenience.
5Examples of estimated ﬁscal rules include Bohn (1998), Taylor (2000), Fatas and Mihov (2001),
Auerbach (2003), Cohen and Follette (2003), Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2004), and Claeys
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where SF
t is the ﬁscal policy regime, which obeys a Markov chain with transition
matrix PF for the two ﬁscal states. Both (1) and (2) allow for heteroskedastic errors,
which Sims and Zha (2004) emphasize are essential for ﬁtting U.S. time series.6
Let St =( SM
t ,SF
t ) denote the joint monetary and ﬁscal policy state. The joint
distribution of policy regimes evolves according to a Markov chain with transition
matrix P = PM ⊗ P F, whose typical element is pij =P r [ St = j |St−1 = i], where P
j pij =1 . With independent switching, the joint policy process has eight states.
1.2. Estimation Results. We use U.S. quarterly data from 1948:2 to 2004:1. To
obtain estimates of (1) that resemble those from the Taylor rule literature, we deﬁne
πt to be the inﬂation rate over the past four quarters. Similarly, estimates of (2) use
the average debt-output ratio over the previous four quarters as a measure of bt−1.
The nominal interest rate is the three-month Treasury bill rate in the secondary
market. Inﬂation is the log diﬀerence in the GDP deﬂator over four quarters. The
output gap is the log deviation of real GDP from the Congressional Budget Oﬃce’s
measure of potential real GDP. All ﬁscal variables are for the federal government only.
τ is federal tax receipts net of total federal transfer payments as a share of GDP, b
is the market value of gross marketable federal debt held by the public as a share
of GDP, and g is federal government consumption plus investment expenditures as a
share of GDP. All variables are converted to quarterly rates.
Parameter estimates are reported in table 1 (standard errors in parentheses) and
estimated transition matrices are in table 2.
For monetary policy, associated with each set of feedback parameters is a high-
and a low-variance state.
7 Monetary policy behavior breaks into periods when it
responds strongly to inﬂation (active policy), as dictated by the Taylor principle, and
periods when it does not (passive policy).8 In the active, volatile periods, the standard
deviation is 3.7 times higher than in the active, docile periods; in passive periods, the
standard deviations diﬀer by a factor of seven. Passive regimes respond twice as
strongly to the output gap, which is consistent with the Fed paying relatively less
6Ireland (2001), Leeper and Roush (2003), and Sims and Zha (2004) argue that allowing money
growth to enter the monetary policy rule is important for identifying policy behavior. To keep to a
speciﬁcation that is comparable to the Taylor rule literature, we exclude money growth.
7We include a dummy variable to absorb the extreme variability in interest rates induced by credit
controls in the second and third quarters of 1980. See Schreft (1990) for a detailed account of the
economics and the politics of those controls.
8In the New Keynesian model of section 2, as Woodford (2003) shows for monetary policy, the
presence of the output gap in the policy rules alters the roots of the linearized system. Because the
gap has only a small eﬀect on the roots, we retain the simple classiﬁcations of active and passive
behavior.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 6
attention to inﬂation stabilization. There are also important diﬀerences in duration
of regime. Active regimes last about 15 quarters each, on average, while the duration
of the docile passive regime is over 22 quarters; the volatile passive regime is most
transient, with a duration of 11.6 quarters.
Tax policies ﬂuctuate between responding by more than the quarterly real interest
rate to debt (passive) and responding negatively to debt (active). The active policy
is what one would expect from automatic stabilizers, which reduce revenues and raise
debt as national income falls. Active policy reacts strongly to government spending,
though by less than one-to-one, while passive policy reacts more weakly. In both
regimes taxes rise systematically and strongly with the output gap, as one would
expect from built-in stabilizers in the tax system. A stronger response to output under
passive policy is consistent with active policy pursuing countercyclical objectives more
vigorously. Assume that on average the same degrees of automatic stabilization and
tax progressivity are in eﬀect in active and passive periods. Because simultaneity
between revenues and output biases downward the coeﬃcient on the gap, a smaller
coeﬃcient is consistent with the idea that when ﬁscal policy is ignoring debt it is
aggressively pursuing countercyclical tax policies.
1.3. Plausibility of Estimates. We consider four checks on the plausibility of the
estimated rules. First, are the estimates reasonable on ap r i o r igrounds? We think
they are, as the rules ﬂuctuate between theoretically interpretable regimes. Monetary
policy ﬂuctuates between periods when it is active, satisfying the Taylor principle
(απ > 1), and periods when it is passive (απ < 1). Passive tax policy responds to
debt by a coeﬃcient that exceeds most estimates of the quarterly real interest rate,
while active tax policy lowers taxes when debt is high.
Second, how well do the estimated equations track the actual paths of the inter-
est rate and taxes? We use the estimates of equations (1) and (2), weighted by the
estimated regime probabilities, to predict the time paths of the short-term nominal
interest rate, R, and the ratio of tax revenues to output, τ, treating all explana-
tory variables as evolving exogenously. The predicted–using smoothed and ﬁltered
probabilities–and actual paths of R and τ appear in ﬁgures 1 and 2. These ﬁts are
easily comparable to those reported by, for example, Taylor (1999a) for monetary
policy.9 The interest-rate equation goes oﬀ track in the 1950s, suggesting that that
9Orphanides (2003b) argues that the poor inﬂation performance from 1965-1979 was due, not to
a weak response of policy to inﬂation, but to a strong response to poor estimates of the output gap
available at the time. Using real-time data on the gap and inﬂation, he claims the ﬁt of a conventional
Taylor rule speciﬁcation–1.5 on inﬂation, .5 on the gap, and a 2 percent real interest rate–is much
improved when real-time data are used rather recent vintage data. Orphanides (2003a) extends thisFLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 7
period might constitute a third distinct regime.
10 The tax rule tracks the revenue-
output ratio extremely well, except in the last year or so when revenues dropped
precipitously.
Third, do the periods estimated to be active and passive jibe with narrative ac-
counts of policy history?11 The estimated marginal probabilities–smoothed and
ﬁltered–of the monetary and ﬁscal states are plotted in ﬁgures 3 and 5. All proba-
bilities reported are at time t, conditional on information available at t − 1, Ωt−1.
Figure 3 reports that, except for a brief active period in 1959-60, monetary policy
was passive from 1948 until the Fed changed operating procedures October 1979 and
policy became active. Monetary policy was consistently active except immediately
after the two recessions in 1991 and 2001. For extended periods during the so-called
“jobless recoveries” monetary policy continued to be less responsive to inﬂation for
t w oo rm o r ey e a r sa f t e rt h eo ﬃcial troughs of the downturns. The passive episode in
1991 became active when the Fed launched its preemptive strike against inﬂation in
1994.12
These results are broadly consistent with previous ﬁndings. From the beginning of
the sample until the Treasury Accord of March 1951, Federal Reserve policy supported
high bond prices to the exclusion of targeting inﬂation, an extreme form of passive
monetary policy. Through the Korean War, monetary policy largely accommodated
the ﬁnancing needs of ﬁscal policy [Ohanian (1997) and Woodford (2001)]. Romer
and Romer (2002) oﬀer narrative evidence that Fed objectives and views about the
economy in the 1950s were very much like those in the 1990s, particularly in its overar-
ching concern about inﬂation. But Romer and Romer (2002, p. 123) quote Chairman
William McChesney Martin’s congressional testimony, in which he explained that
“the 1957-58 recession was a direct result of letting inﬂation get substantially ahead
of us.” The Romers also mention that FOMC “members felt they had not reacted
soon enough in 1955 [to oﬀset the burst of inﬂation]” (p. 122). To buttress their nar-
rative case, the Romers estimate a forward-looking Taylor rule from 1952:1-1958:4.
They conclude that policy was active: the response of the interest rate to inﬂation
argument to the 1950s. The ﬁt of our switching regression for monetary policy is far superior to
Orphanides’s over the 1960:2-1966:4 period, yet our results label this as a period of passive monetary
policy.
10We tried a three-regime speciﬁcation, but rejected it because the response of the interest rate
to output was negative.
11Our mapping of regime probabilities into narrative accounts of policy draws on Pechman (1987),
Poterba (1994), Romer and Romer (2004), Stein (1996), Steuerle (2002), and Yang (2004)
12An appendix considers alternative speciﬁcations of the policy process that increase the duration
of the active monetary policy regime by re-labeling these periods active.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 8
was 1.178 with a standard error of .876. Our estimate of this response coeﬃcient in
passive regimes is .522, which is less than one standard error below the Romers’ point
estimate. The Fed might well have intended to be vigilant against inﬂation, but it
appears not to have acted to prevent the 1955 inﬂation. More importantly for our
purposes, the data cannot sharply distinguish between active and passive monetary
policy behavior through most of the 1950s. The brief burst of active monetary policy
late in 1959 and early in 1960 is consistent with the Romers’ (2002) ﬁnding that the
Fed raised the real interest rate in this period to combat inﬂation. From 1960-1979,
monetary policy responded weakly to inﬂation, while since the mid-1980s the Fed has
reacted strongly to inﬂation, a pattern found in many studies [Taylor (1999a), Clar-
ida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), Romer and Romer (2002) and Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004)].
Figure 4 plots the nominal interest rate, inﬂation, the monetary regime, and the
NBER business cycle dates. Active monetary periods are denoted by AM and passive
period by PM. No pattern emerges linking recessions to monetary regime, suggesting
that regime changes do not merely reﬂect changes in policy behavior over the business
cycle.
Estimates of the tax rule in (2) reveal substantially more regime instability than for
monetary policy. Over the post-war period, there were 12 ﬁscal regime changes, with
tax policy spending 55 percent of the time in the active regime. Figure 5 shows that
the model associates tax policy with regimes that accord well with narrative histories.
Fiscal policy was active in the beginning of the sample. Despite an extremely high
level of debt from World War II expenditures, Congress overrode President Truman’s
veto in early 1948 to cut taxes. Although, as Stein (1996) recounts the history,
legislators argued that cutting taxes would reduce the debt, the debt-GDP ratio rose
while revenues as a share of GDP fell. In 1950 and 1951 policy became passive, as
taxes were increased and excess proﬁts taxes were extended into 1953 to ﬁnance the
Korean War, consistent with the budget-balancing goals of both the Truman and the
Eisenhower Administrations. From the mid-50s, through the Kennedy tax cut of 1964,
and into the second half of the 1960s, ﬁscal policy was active, paying little attention
to debt. There followed a period of about 15 years when ﬁscal policy ﬂuctuated in
its degree of concern about debt relative to economic conditions.
President Carter signed a bill to cut taxes to stimulate the economy in early 1979,
initiating a period of active ﬁscal policy that extended through the Reagan Admin-
istration’s Economic Recovery Plan of 1981. By the mid-1980s, the probability of
passive tax policy increased as legislation was passed in 1982 and 1984 to raise rev-
enues in response to the rapidly increasing debt-output ratio. Following PresidentFLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 9
Clinton’s tax hike in 1993, ﬁscal policy switched to being passive through the 2001
tax cut. President Bush’s tax reductions in 2002 and 2003 made ﬁscal policy active
again.
Some readers might regard as perverse the negative response of taxes to debt in
the active ﬁscal regime. A negative correlation arises naturally over the business
cycle, as recessions automatically lower revenues and raise debt. Figure 6 plots the
debt-output and net taxes-output ratios along with dashed vertical lines marking
NBER business cycle peaks and troughs, and solid vertical lines marking ﬁscal regime
switches between active (AF) and passive (PF) behavior. Two active ﬁscal regimes
appear to be generated by recessions: the late 1940s and 1973:4-1975:1 almost exactly
coincide with the cycle. But there are extended periods of active behavior, which
include but do not coincide with recessions [1955:4-1965:2 and 1978:4-1984:3]. There
are also instances in which recessions occur during periods of passive ﬁscal policy
[1990:3-1991:1 and 2001:1-2001:4]. Taken together these results suggest that the tax
rule does more than simply identify active regimes with economic downturns.
Favero and Monacelli (2003) estimate switching regressions similar to (1) and (2).
They also ﬁnd that monetary policy was passive from 1961 to 1979. In contrast to
our results, Favero and Monacelli do not detect any tendency to return to passive
policy following the 1991 and 2001 recessions, though they do estimate one regime,
which emerges from 1985:2-2000:4 and 2002:2-2002:4, in which monetary policy is
only borderline active. It is diﬃcult to compare their estimates of ﬁscal policy to ours
because Favero and Monacelli use the net-of-interest deﬁcit as the policy variable.
Although common in empirical work on ﬁscal policy, this has the drawback of con-
founding spending and tax policies. Moreover, for the purpose of obtaining a policy
process to embed in a DSGE model, treating the deﬁcit as the control variable is
problematic because spending and tax shocks generally have very diﬀerent impacts.
Like us, though, Favero and Monacelli ﬁnd that ﬁscal policy is more unstable than
monetary policy.
1.4. Joint Policy Process. It is convenient, and does no violence to the qualita-
tive predictions of the theory, to aggregate the four monetary states to two states.
We aggregate the high- and low-variance states for both the active and the passive
regimes, weighted by the regimes’ ergodic probabilities. An analogous transformation







(3)FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 10
and variance are σ2
R(St = Active)=4 .0576e−6 and σ2
R(St = Passive)=1 .8002e−5.








.8908 .0597 .0464 .0031
.0494 .9011 .0026 .0469
.0164 .0011 .9208 .0617




Probabilities on the main diagonal are P[AM/PF |AM/PF ],P[AM/AF |AM/AF ],
P[PM/PF|PM/PF], and P[PM/AF|PM/AF]. The transition matrix implies that
all states communicate and each state is recurring, so the economy visits each one
inﬁnitely often. The probabilities of the joint distribution of policies, appearing in
ﬁgure 7, are computed using (4).
Figure 7 shows that the joint probabilities of policies also correspond to periods
that have been noted in the literature. Both policies were passive in the early 1950s,
when the Fed supported bond prices (and gradually phased out that support) and
ﬁscal policy was ﬁnancing the Korean War [Ohanian (1997) and Woodford (2001)].
From the late 1960s through most of the 1970s, both policies were again passive.
Arguing this, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) claim the policy mix allowed for
bursts of inﬂation and output from self-fulﬁlling expectations. Using data only from
1960-1979, it is easy to see how one might reach this conclusion. The early-to-mid-
1980s, when monetary policy was aggressively ﬁghting inﬂation and ﬁscal policy was
ﬁnancing interest payments with new debt issuances, gets labeled as doubly active
policies. Finally, the mid-1980s on is largely a period of active monetary and passive
ﬁscal policies, as most models of monetary policy assume [Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(2000), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and the papers in Bryant, Hooper, and
Mann (1993) and Taylor (1999b)].
T h ee c o n o m yh a ss p e n tt h em o s tt i m ei nac o m b i n a t i o no fp a s s i v em o n e t a r yw i t h
active ﬁscal policies, the mix associated with the ﬁscal theory of the price level [Leeper
(1991), Sims (1994), Woodford (1995), and Cochrane (1999)]. A substantial fraction
of the sample combined passive monetary and tax policies, a combination, which
if it were expected to persist forever, would leave the equilibrium undetermined in
many theoretical models. Almost equal fractions of time are spent in the active
monetary/passive ﬁscal regime–the policy mix assumed to prevail in most mon-
etary analyses–and the active/active mix. If the active/active combination were
expected to last forever, theory suggests that no equilibrium would exist, because
private agents’ transversality conditions or some feasibility conditions are violated.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 11
Taken together, the marginal and joint probabilities paint a picture of post-war
monetary and ﬁscal policies that is broadly in accord with both narrative accounts
and ﬁxed-regime policy rule estimates.
A ﬁnal check on the plausibility of the estimates asks if estimated policies make
sense when they are embedded in a conventional DSGE model. Section 4 answers
this question in detail.13
2. A Conventional Model with Nominal Rigidities
This is a standard model with monopolistic competition and sticky prices in goods
markets.14 We extend the model to include lump-sum taxes and nominal government
debt.






















with 0 <β<1,σ>0,η>0,κ>0,χ>0 and δ>0.C t is a composite consumption












The household chooses cjt to minimize expenditure on the continuum of goods














is the aggregate price level at t.
13A key limitation of the estimates stems from the absence of identiﬁcation. This approach follows
closely existing empirical work on simple policy rules, which usually does not estimate the rules as
parts of a fully speciﬁed model. We are reassured in doing this by the model-based maximum
likelihood estimates of Ireland (2001) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), which are very close to
single-equation estimates of Taylor rules. It is noteworthy, though, that in an identiﬁed monetary
VAR, Sims and Zha (2004) conclude that monetary policy was consistently active since 1960; they
do not consider ﬁscal behavior.
14Detailed expositions of the model appear in Yun (1996, 2004), Woodford (2003), and Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2004).FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 12






















where τt is lump-sum taxes/transfers from the government to the household, Bt is
one-period nominal bonds, Qt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for the price at t
of one unit of composite consumption goods at t+1 , and Πt is proﬁts from the ﬁrm,



















If Rt denotes the risk-free gross nominal interest rate between t and t+1, then absence























We assume the government demands goods in the same proportion that households
















2.2. Firms. A continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms produce goods using
labor. Production of good j is given by
yjt = AtNjt, (14)
where At is an aggregate technology shock, common across ﬁrms.







where Yt is deﬁned by
Ct + Gt = Yt. (16)

















Following Calvo (1983), a fraction 1 − ϕ ﬁrms are permitted to adjust their prices
each period, while the fraction ϕ are not permitted to adjust. If ﬁrms are permitted to
adjust at t, they choose a new optimal price, p∗
t, to maximize the expected discounted


















where Qt,t+i = β
i(Ct/Ct+i)σ and proﬁts have been rewritten using (17). Ψt is real



































































where K1t denotes the numerator and K2t denotes the denominator. Note that these
two expressions have the following recursive representations:















Solving (23) for p∗
t and using the result in the price index
P
1−θ





















where µ ≡ θ/(θ − 1).
2.3. Aggregation. We assume that individual labor services may be aggregated lin-





Linear aggregation of individual market clearing conditions implies
AtNt = ∆tYt, (29)














It is natural to deﬁne aggregate proﬁts as the sum of individual ﬁrm proﬁts, Πt = R 1
0 Πjtdj, so (18) and (??) imply that the aggregate proﬁt ﬂow can be expressed asFLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 15




Substituting (32) into the household’s budget constraint, (8), and combining the




Nt = Ct + Gt. (33)
We now derive the law of motion of relative price dispersion. From the deﬁnition
of price dispersion, (30) and (26), relative price dispersion evolves according to









where πt = Pt/Pt−1.
2.4. Policy Speciﬁcation. Monetary and ﬁscal policies follow (1) and (2), where the
error terms are taken to be standardnormal and i.i.d. The processes for {Gt,τt,R t,M t,B t}
must satisfy the government budget identity







given M−1 > 0 and R−1B−1.
3. Calibration and Solution Method
Parameters describing preferences, technology and price adjusmtent for the bench-
mark nonsynchronous switching model are speciﬁed to be consistent with other work,
such as Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Woodford (2003). We calibrate the
model at a quarterly frequency. The markup of price over marginal cost is set to 15
percent, impying µ = θ(1 − θ)−1 =1 .15 and 66 percent of ﬁrms are unable to reset
their price each period, implying ϕ = .66. The quarterly real interest rate is set to 1
percent, implying β = .99. Each intermediate goods producing ﬁrm has access to a
production function with constant returns to labor. The technology parameter, A,i s
chosen to normalize the deterministic steady state level of output to be 1.
The coeﬃcient on real balances in the utility function, δ, is set to ensure that
velocity in the deterministic steady state, deﬁned as cP/M, matches average U.S.
monetary base velocity at 2.4. This value comes from the period 1959-2004 and
uses the average real expenditure on non-durable consumption plus services. The
parameter governing the interest elasticity of real money balances, κ, is set to 2.6, aFLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 16
value consistent with Mankiw and Summers (1986), Lucas (1988), and Chari, Kehoe,
and McGrattan (2000).
Reaction coeﬃcients in the policy rules are taken from the estimates in table 1 and
the four-state joint transition matrix (4). The intercepts in the policy rules govern the
deterministic steady state values of inﬂation and debt-output in the computational
model. Intercepts are set so the deterministic steady state is common across all
regimes and match their sample means from 1948:2-2004:1. Those values, annualized,
are π =3 .43% and b = .3525. Government purchases, as a share of output, are ﬁxed
in the model at its mean value of .115.
We compute the solution using the monotone map method, based on Coleman
(1991). The algorithm requires a set of initial candidate decision rules that reduce
the system to a set of non-linear expectational ﬁrst-order diﬀerence equations. The
complete model consists of the ﬁrst-order necessary conditions from the representative
agent and ﬁrms’ optimization problem, constraints, speciﬁcation of policy, the price
adjustment process, and the transversality conditions on real balances and bonds. The
solution is a set of functions that map the state, Θt = {bt−1,w t−1,∆t−1,θ t,ψ t,S t},
into values for the endogenous variables.
Implementation of the algorithm begins by conjecturing an initial set of rules, which
we take to be the solution from the models ﬁxed-regime counterpart. Speciﬁcally, we
take the solutions from ﬁxed-regime model with AM/PF and PM/AF policies as the
initial rules for the corresponding regimes in the nonsynchronous switching model.
For the AM/AF and PM/PF regimes there are no stationary, unique ﬁxed-regime
counterparts, so we use the solution from the PM/AF ﬁxed-regime model to initialize
the algorithm. To ensure the solution is not sensitive to initial coniditions, we also
use the solution from the AM/PF regime and weighted averages of the two. Further
pertubations of the initial rules have no eﬀect on the ﬁnal solution, suggesting the
solution is locally unique. The appendix more fully draws out connections between
determinacy and uniqueness in linear models with convergence of the monotone map
algorithm.
Taking the initial rules for labor, b hN(Θt)=Nt, and the functions determining the
ﬁrm’s optimal pricing decision, b hK1(Θt)=K1,t and b hK2(Θt)=K2,t,w eﬁnd values

















t + ϕβEtb h
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where hC(Θt+1)=( A/∆t)b hN(Θt) − g.G i v e n Nt,K 1,t,K 2,t, we compute the en-





are states at t +1 .
Gauss-Hermite integration is used over possible values for θt+1,ψ t+1 and St+1,y i e l d -






, EtK1,t+1,E tK2,t+1 and reduces the above system to three
equations in three unknowns. The (net) nominal interest rate is restricted to always
be positive.
When solving the above system, the state vector and the decision rules are taken
as given. The system is solved for every set of state variables deﬁned over a discrete
partition of the state space. This procedure is repeated until the iteration improves
the current decision rule at any given state vector by less than some  . Local unique-
ness is more formally discussed in appendix B, which considers a relation between
numerical converge using the monotone map and uniqueness in a linear univariate
framework. While the regime-switching model is greatly more complex than a linear
univariate model, the monotone map algorithm does converge for the estimated pa-
rameter settings. Using parameters that suggest indeterminacy, such as setting all
regimes to PM/PF, does result in failure of the algorithm to converge. To argue for
local uniqueness, we start with a wide set of initial rules, all of which converge to the
equilibrium we report in the following section.
4. Equilibrium with Policy Switching
4.1. Preliminaries. In discussing notions of stationarity in regime-switching frame-
works, the following deﬁnitions, adapted from Francq and Zakoian (2001) are useful.








where Qt,T is a stochastic discount factorfor pricing arbitrary (possibly state-contingent)
ﬁnancial claims.
Deﬁnition 1. For b0 < ∞,S 0 ∈ S a n das e q u e n c e{St}
∞
t=0 that evolves according
to P M ⊗ PF, a globally stable macro policy implies the unconditional expectation of
discounted debt is zero, E[bt]=0 .
Deﬁnition 2. For b0 < ∞,S 0 = j and a sequence {St = j}
∞
t=0 for all t al o c a l l y
stable macro policy implies the conditional expectation of discounted debt is zero,
E[bt|St = j]=0 .
A zero expected present value of debt is equivalent to the intertemporal equilibrium
conditionFLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 18
bt = xt + zt, (39)
where x and z are the expected present values of the primary surplus and seigniorage,
































Cochrane (1999, 2001) refers to (39) as a “debt valuation” equation because bt =
Bt/Pt and ﬂuctuations in x or z can induce jumps in Pt, which alter the real value of
debt to keep it consistent with expected policies. In practice, we check whether the
expected present value of debt is zero following an exogenous shock by computing x
and z and comparing their sum to b. All the results satisfy this restriction.
4.2. Fixed Policy Regimes. As a ﬁrst step in the analysis of the nature of equi-
librium under the estimated policy process, we consider a ﬁrst-order approximation
of the nonlinear model around its deterministic steady state when policy regime is
permanent. We use Juillard’s (2003) Dynare program to check for existence and
uniqueness in each of the estimated policy regimes. Locally unique equilibria exist
under both active monetary/passive ﬁscal and passive monetary/active ﬁscal policy
regimes. No equilibrium exists when both policies are active and multiple equilibria
exist when both policies are passive. This suggests that at least locally, when regimes
are ﬁxed, our labelling of estimated policies as “active” and “passive” is consistent
with theory.
Active monetary and passive ﬁscal policies produce the equilibrium studied in the
vast recent literature on monetary policy rules [Taylor (1999b) and Woodford (2003)].
An i.i.d. monetary expansion generates a one-period decrease in the nominal interest
rate and i.i.d. contemporaneous increases in inﬂation and output. Ricardian equiva-
lence holds, so a debt-ﬁnanced tax cut merely substitutes current for future taxation.
Under passive monetary and active ﬁscal policies, i.i.d. policy disturbances generate
(at initial prices) wealth eﬀects whose impacts are propagated by the weak, but
positive, response of monetary policy to inﬂation. Changes in wealth arise because tax
policy does not adjust future taxes in order to neutralize wealth eﬀects. A monetary
expansion reduces the nominal interest rate and debt (via an open-market purchase),
which reduces wealth and aggregate demand. Inﬂation falls and, after an initialFLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 19
increase, output falls. This outcome is perverse relative to conventional theories,
which are predicated on active monetary and passive ﬁscal policies. Lower current
taxes increase wealth and demand, which raises inﬂation and output. Tax eﬀects are
consistent with traditional Keynesian theories. In both cases, the transitory policy
shock has persistent impacts because monetary policy passively adjusts the interest
rate with inﬂation.15
4.3. Characterization of Equilibrium. One feature of the regime-switching model
is that monetary and ﬁscal policy are free to switch independently of one another.
An immediate implication is that the model temporarily permits policy combinations
with passive monetary and passive ﬁscal policies, as well as active monetary and
active ﬁscal policies. A passive-passive policy combination gives rise to indetermi-
nate equilibrium in ﬁxed-regime versions of the model, admitting the possibility for
sunspot shocks that aﬀect equilibrium allocations. An active-active policy combina-
tion results in a nonstationary path for real debt, implying no stationary equilibrium
exists. Solving the model with computation methods, the model converges to a lo-
cally unique equilibrium with dynamics that imply a globally stationary path for real
debt.
To study the equilibrium properties of the model, we choose to ﬁr s tl o o ka tm o n e -
tary and ﬁscal shocks conditional on regime, then look at monetary and ﬁscal shocks
arising from Monte Carlo experiments.
4.4. Nonlinear Impulse Response Analysis. Although the decision rules reﬂect
agents’ knowledge of the true switching policy process, to separate the impacts of
regime from the impacts of i.i.d. policy shocks, we consider a stylized experiment.
Assume the economy is in a regime-dependent stationary equilibrium. Perturb the
error term in a policy rule and solve for equilibrium time paths, conditioning on
remaining in the prevailing regime. We compute the paths of variables relative to
their regime-dependent stationary values. On impact, the response of endogenous
variable k for this conditional impulse response is given by
φk(θ,ψ|ΘJ)=h
k(bJ,w J,∆J,θ,ψ,J) − h
k(bJ,w J,∆J,0,0,J) (42)
where bJ,w J and ∆J are regime-dependent stationary values for regime J and ΘJ is
the regime-dependent stationary state for regime J. As the notation suggests, the
eﬀects of policy shocks in the regime-switching model depend on initial conditions.
This experiment is highly stylized and useful for understanding the dynamics of the
model, but not for establishing the average response to a shock. Following initial
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impact, the value of variable k after n periods for this conditional impulse response
is given by
φk,n(θ,ψ|ΘJ)=h
k(bn−1,w n−1,∆n−1,0,0,J) − h
k(bJ,w J,∆J,0,0,J) (43)
for n>1,w i t hbJ ≡ b0. (43) is still a function of the intitial shocks, θ and ψ, because
the impulse responses are state (or history) dependent.
Also of interest is the average response of a variable to a shock, where the mean is
computed over future regimes. For such an experiment, the impact period is computed
the same as above, but then the generalized impulse response of variable k after n
p e r i o d si sg i v e nb y
φk,n(θ,ψ|ΘJ)=EJ[h
k(bn−1,w n−1,∆n−1,0,0,J)] − h
k(bJ,w J,∆J,0,0,J) (44)
where EJ denotes expectations taken conditional on St = J and θn = ψn =0for
n>1. The diﬀerence between the two types of impulse response is that (42) and
(43) holds the regime constant throughout, whereas and (44) averages over future
realizations of regimes, yielding the average response to a policy shock. The averaging
is done using Monte Carlo simulations where draws for the regime are taken from the
estimated Markov chain. The responses are then averaged across each simulation.
4.4.1. A Fiscal Expansion. Figure 8 reports paths following a two-standard deviation
cut in taxes in period 5, conditional, in turn, on the stationary means for the AM/PF,
PM/AF, and PM/PF regimes. The ﬁgure reports the conditional impulse responses
given by (42) and (43). Regardless of the prevailing regime, an i.i.d. cut in lump-sum
taxes ﬁnanced by new sales of nominal government debt generates wealth eﬀects that
increase aggregate demand, inﬂation, and output. In each regime–even AM/PF,
where taxes rise by more than the real interest in response to debt–the higher real
value of debt is associated with increases in the expected present values of both net-
of-interest surpluses and seigniorage.
Wealth eﬀects do not stem from a changes in the resources available to the economy,
such as arise productivity or government purchases. Instead, tax cuts generate the
wealth eﬀects by increasing the path of consumption the representative household be-
lieves it can aﬀord at initial prices and interest rates. Under an initially passive ﬁscal
policy, agents increase demand because they incorporate the probability of switching
to an active ﬁscal regime where taxes will not rise suﬃciently to repay the increase
in real debt. In the event of a switch to an active ﬁscal policy, the higher level of real
debt arising from the ﬁscal expansion leads to a still lower level of lump-sum taxes,
given the negative coeﬃc i e n to nl a g g e dd e b t . W h e nﬁscal policy is initially active,
agents incorporate the probability of staying in the active regime. In either case,
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probability that future lump-sum taxes will not suﬃciently rise to completely repay
outstanding debt.
There is positive probability that an increase in the real value of debt arising from
a ﬁscal expansion may not be retired in the future with higher lump-sum taxes.
However, regardless of what regime materializes in the future, the government policy
process must ﬁnance purchases and outstanding debt plus interest without persis-
tently running primary deﬁcits [McCallum (1984)].16 Consequently, the government
must back a ﬁs c a le x p a n s i o nw i t hac o m b i n a t i o no fd i s c o u n t e dp r i m a r ys u r p l u s e s
and seigniorage. Figure 8 highlights the increase in seigniorage following the ﬁscal
expansion. Seigniorage in ﬁxed regime models does not respond to tax induced ﬁs-
cal expansions because debt is completely backed by future lump-sum taxes. In a
ﬁxed-regime PM/AF model, Woodford (1998) points out that unexpected inﬂation
and a lower real rate following a ﬁscal expansion are additional factors that allow the
government to ﬁnance outstanding debt with lower primary surpluses. The rise is in
the present value of seigniorage implies that future money creation will, at some point
in the future, be used to retire outstanding government debt. In equilibrium, agents
then rationally view debt as an increase in net wealth, have incentives to economize
on money holdings due to the positive probability of an increase in future money
creation, and therefore, increase aggregate demand.
In all regimes, the i.i.d. tax cut is propagated for many periods when monetary
policy raises the nominal interest rate in response to the expansion in aggregate
demand. When monetary policy is passive, with a relatively small response to inﬂation
(απ = .522 in the estimates), the impact on inﬂation lasts about 5 years. A stronger
response of monetary policy to inﬂation, as occurs when monetary policy is active
(απ =1 .31), spreads the impacts of a tax cut over many more years.
The reason active monetary policy induces more serial correlation in inﬂation and
output arises from the speed of seigniorage extraction. As απ declines, the shorter the
time horizon over which seigniorage is extracted, as Davig, Leeper, and Chung (2004)
show. Combining slow debt repayment with an active monetary authority, which
extracts seigniorage over a long time horizon, generates a very persistent increase in
debt. The wealth eﬀects arising from higher debt then generate persistence in output
16Franq and Zoakian (2001) show in a general framework that Markov-switching processes can be
locally explosive, yet globally stable. Davig (2004) shows that a properly restricted Markov-switching
process for discounted debt can be locally explosive, yet globally stable and therefore, satisfy the
transversality condition for debt. Given that the ergodic mean of debt from a long simulated series
(N = 500,000) from the regime-switching New Keynesian model has a ﬁnite mean that is close to the
deterministic steady state, we conclude the debt is globally stable and the transversality condition
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and inﬂation. Passive monetary policy extracts seigniorage more quickly, repays debt
more quickly and reduces the persistence in output and inﬂation.
It is a common view that because the ﬁscal theory of the price level emphasizes
the ﬁscal ﬁnancing consequences of alternative policies, just as Sargent and Wallace
(1981) do, the theory relies heavily on debt monetization and, therefore, is irrelevant
for understanding the inﬂation process in most developed countries [King (1995)
and Castro, Resende, and Ruge-Murcia (2003)]. The model’s results contradict this
perception. Across all regimes, the deterministic steady state levels of inﬂation and
seigniorage are identical: inﬂation matches the average for the United States and
seigniorage is only 0.8 percent of output, which is in line with King’s (1995) estimates
for the United States.
4.4.2. A Monetary Expansion. Responses to an i.i.d. monetary expansion appear in
ﬁgure 9. For the stationary regimes, the short-run impacts are completely conven-
tional in this class of models: output and inﬂation expand. Under the constant
AM/PF policy, there is no propagation of inﬂation and output and the eﬀects disap-
pear after the initial impact. In a ﬁxed-regime setup, active monetary and passive
ﬁscal policies neutralize the wealth eﬀects of an open-market purchase by adjusting
lump-sum taxes enough to fully ﬁnance the increase in the real value of debt. This
does not occur in the switching setup using the estimated policy rules in any of the
stationary regimes. So, the injection of liquidity is coupled with a reduction in wealth
because the expected present value of future taxes does not decline by the full amount
of the decline in debt. However, the monetary expansion increases the nominal supply
for the impact period and with the presence of nominal rigidities, increases aggregate
demand. The speed at which inﬂation and output rise back to their initial levels is
determined by how rapidly wealth returns to its initial level.
As the ﬁgure shows, lower wealth reduces demand, inﬂation, and output over longer
horizons. The ﬁgure makes it appear that those wealth eﬀects are more moderate
when monetary policy is active than when it is passive but as table 4 shows, in the
long run monetary policy shocks are more potent when monetary policy is active.
4.4.3. Generalized Impulse Responses. The previous section holds the regime con-
stant before, during and after the policy shock. The resulting dynamics diﬀer from
ﬁxed-regime counterparts because agents’ decision rules incorporate the probability
of switching regimes. This section allows future regimes to vary stochastically after
the policy shock and is more consistent with the notion that regime changes do occur
and have important implications for the dynamics of the economy.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 23
Generalized impulse response function condition on the regime dependent station-
ary values for debt, price dispersion, and real wealth, then shock either ﬁscal policy
or monetary policy and draw regime from the estimated four-state Markov chain.
The results report the average at each date across all draws. For example, we report
dynamic responses for inﬂation, {πj}T
j=0, by computing the following sample analog







where Θ0 denotes a particular initial state. We set N =1 0 ,000 and turn oﬀ shocks
to θt and ψt for all t following the shock.
For the three stationary regimes, Figure 10 shows the mean and one standard
deviation bands of the generalized impulse responses following a ﬁscal expansion.
The ﬁrst 4 periods condition on the stationary mean and a particular regime, period
5 imposes the shock and continues to condition on regime, period 6 onward then
makes random draws over regimes. While the properties of the responses depend
on the initial conditions, of interest is that a one-period ﬁscal expansion generates a
hump-shaped response of inﬂation and output, even under an initial AM/PF policy.
T h er e s p o n s e sr e s e m b l et h o s ea r i s i n gf r o mi d e n t i ﬁed VARs focusing on the eﬀects of
ﬁscal policy [Blanchard and Perotti (2002)]. For regimes with passive ﬁscal policy,
the inﬂation and output responses are stronger for the periods immediately following
the shock, but die out more quickly.
The dynamic properties of the generalized impulse responses rest with the evolution
of regimes. Given that regimes are relatively persistent–the transition probability of
staying in the same regime is greater than .9 for all regimes–the dynamics for the few
periods following the shock resemble those from the impulse responses that condition
on a constant regime. For example, a ﬁscal expansion in the AM/PF regime leads to
a small, but very persistent output and inﬂation response. The PM/PF regime gener-
ates a larger output and inﬂation response the period of the shock, but the responses
are much less persistent than in the AM/PF regime. Consider the generalized impulse
response in the PM/PF regime, there is a strong output and inﬂation response that
is more persistent than when conditioning on this regime. The additional persistence
arises from realizations of active ﬁscal regimes in the periods following the shock,
where the higher level of debt is very slowly repaid. Averaging over many realiza-
tions of the diﬀerent regime paths results in a more persistent response than when
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The eﬀects of innovations to the interest rate are short-lived, as they are in this
class of models with i.i.d. innovations. Adding regime switching does not induce a
propagation mechanism as it does with tax innovations.
4.4.4. AM/AF Regime. This section assesses the implications of a shift to the regime
where both monetary and ﬁscal policy are active and consequently, debt is nonsta-
tionary. The active ﬁscal regime has taxes respond negatively to debt. An important
aspect of the analysis for the AM/AF regime regards the initial conditions, since they
matter for the dynamics. A shift to the AM/AF regime results in a large tax cut if
the initial level of debt is roughly below the ergodic mean, whereas the same shift
causes a tax increase if initial debt is above the ergodic mean.
Responses under various initial conditions are given in ﬁgure 12. One interesting
feature of the dynamic response under the high level of initial debt, set to .9, is the
hump-shape response of inﬂation and output. The switch to AM/AF under a high
level of debt reduces taxes and causes an increase in aggregate demand, which is
partially oﬀset by an active monetary authority. These factors work to keep prices
relatively stable in the period of the switch. Given the persistence of the AM/AF
regime, inﬂation for several periods is quite low. Eventually, there is a switch to
passive monetary policy, allowing the aggregate demand eﬀects to have a stronger
impact on inﬂation. The eventual realization of the passive monetary policy, again
averaged over many simulations, causes the hump-shaped response.
To better understand the dynamics of how regimes evolve, ﬁgure 13 plots the
proportion of runs where each regime was in place at each point in time. For example,
the upper-right graphs shows that at t =1 , the AM/AF regime was in place for all
10,000 runs of the simulation, since this is initial condition for every simulation. After
10 quarters, approximately 45% of the simulations still had the AM/AF regime in
place, 20% in the AM/PF regime, 11% in the PM/PF regime and 24% in PM/AM.
So, following a tax cut, it is the eventual movement, on average, to a regime with a
passive monetary policy that generates the hump-shaped response. As an implication,
we should see the hump get pushed further out as the persistence of the AM/AF
regime increases.
5. Ergodic Properties
The ergodic properties of the model reveal an interesting tradeoﬀ between inﬂation
or output variability and debt-output variability. Active monetary policy generates
lower inﬂation and output variability relative to a passive monetary policy. Although
the eﬀects of shocks under active monetary policy are very persistent, the impact
responses of output and inﬂation to shocks are much lower relative to those under aFLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 25
passive monetary policy. Under passive monetary policy, shocks are not as persistent,
but have large impacts on inﬂation and ouptut. The resulting variability of these
variables are then higher than under active monetary policy.
A passive monetary policy yields lower debt-output variability, but at the expense
of higher inﬂation and output variability. Given the debt-output ratio is only impor-
tant for welfare insofar as it aﬀects consumption, leisure and real balances, it seems
these ﬁndings are consistent with work that ﬁnds active monetary policy as welfare
maximizing.
6. Concluding Remarks
Estimation of a monetary policy rule with regime-dependent parameters, including
the shock variance, endogenously splits the sample of postwar U.S. data between
active and passive policy regimes. The timing of regimes accord with other studies,
such as Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), that exogenously break the sample around
1979, where pre-1979 monetary policy is passive and then active (although, we do
ﬁnd episodes post-1979 when monetary policy was passive). Estimation of a ﬁscal
policy rule with regime-dependent parameters, also including the shock variance,
delineates between active and passive policy regimes. The regimes alternate frequently
throughout U.S. history and can be linked to policy reforms, instead of just reﬂecting
changes in policy arising from economic conditions.
Having estimates of the switching policy rules in hand, we progress to embed them
in an otherwise standard model. The resulting model admits the possibility of switch-
ing to policy combinations that imply indeterminacy (PM/PF) and explosiveness
(AM/AF) under ﬁxed-regimes. Solving the model with computation methods, the
model converges to a locally unique equilibrium with dynamics that imply a globally
stationary path for real debt. The resulting dynamics of the regime-switching model
diﬀer from their ﬁxed-regime counterparts, primarily in the response of output and
inﬂation to ﬁscal expansions. Tax cuts under AM/PF policy generate an increase in
inﬂation and output, responses not observed in ﬁxed-regime models due to Ricardian
equivalence. Moreover, the response of output and inﬂation to i.i.d. tax shocks under
AM/PF policy are extremely persistent. The PM/PF regime exhibits similar dynam-
ics to the AM/PF following a tax cut, though output and inﬂation exhibit much less
inﬂation. Debt is nonstationary in the AM/AF regime. Monetary policy shocks look
similar to their ﬁxed regime counterparts.
One interesting trade-oﬀ t h a te m e r g e si sb e t w e e ni n ﬂation or output variability
and debt-output variability. Under an active monetary policy, inﬂation and output
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debt-output variability. Passive monetary policy yields low debt variability, but at
the expense of high inﬂation and output variability. Given the debt-output ratio
is only important for welfare insofar as it aﬀects consumption, leisure and real bal-
ances, it seems these ﬁndings are consistent with work that ﬁnds active monetary
policy as welfare maximizing. We leave formal welfare analysis in a regime-switching
environment for future work.
A ﬁnal point connects the regime-switching model with existing empirical work
on ﬁscal policy. Simulating data from a ﬁxed-regime NK model and then ﬁtting a
V A Rt ot h er e s u l t i n gd a t a ,a n du s i n gi d e n t i ﬁcation methods similar to Blanchard and
Perotti (2002), tax shock do not aﬀect output and inﬂation. However, the identiﬁed
structural VAR in Blanchard and Perotti reports strong output eﬀects following a tax
induced ﬁscal expansion. Simulating data from the regime-switching model and then
ﬁtting a VAR, using the same identiﬁcation as with the ﬁxed regime, yields positive
output response to tax innovations. Thus, giving taxes a role in DSGE models that
empirical work suggests they should have.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 27
Appendix A. An Analytical Example
17
This section lays out a simpliﬁed theoretical model with monetary and ﬁscal policy
switching that yields an analytical solution. The model establishes that when mon-
etary and ﬁscal policies experience on-going regime change, several principles that
guide the development of policy models today are called into question. For tractabil-
ity, it is necessary to deviate somewhat from the speciﬁcations of the estimated rules,
(1) and (2). We show that:
• equilibrium is determinate (in the class of bounded equilibria) even if there
are periods in which both monetary and ﬁscal policy are passive;
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• a stationary equilibrium can exist even if there are periods when both mone-
tary and ﬁscal policy are active;
• tax shocks always matter for aggregate demand and inﬂation, even if the
Taylor principle is satisﬁed in some periods;
• t h er e s p o n s eo fi n ﬂation to an i.i.d. monetary policy disturbance is serially
correlated, even if the Taylor principle is satisﬁed;
• the impact and persistence of policy shocks is greater the stronger is the long-
run response of monetary policy to inﬂation.
Consider an endowment version of Sidrauski (1967). A representative household has
logarithmic, time-separable preferences over consumption and real money balances.
The household can hold money and one-period nominal government debt that pays a
gross nominal interest rate of Rt on debt that matures in period t+1. With constant
government purchases, g,in equilibrium, private consumption, c, will also be constant.
The agent pays real lump-sum taxes in the amount Tt each period. The model implies
a Fisher equation
1/Rt = βEt[1/πt+1], (45)
where 0 <β<1 is the discount factor, πt+1 is the gross rate of inﬂation between t and
t+1, and the expectation is taken with respect to a set Ωt that contains information
dated t and earlier, including the history of regimes up to t. The money demand
function is
17This section was written by Hess Chung.
18The active/passive regime categorization has a useful dynamic interpretation. If monetary
policy behavior provides a boundary condition for the inﬂa t i o np r o c e s s ,a si td o e sw h e ni to b e y st h e
Taylor principle, then monetary policy is active; otherwise it is passive. Analogously, if ﬁscal policy
behavior provides a boundary condition for the real debt process, as it does under the ﬁscal theory
of price level determination, then ﬁscal policy is active;o t h e r w i s ei ti spassive.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 28
mt = c(1 − 1/Rt)
−1 , (46)
where mt = Mt/Pt is real money balances.
Monetary policy adjusts the nominal interest rate in response to inﬂation
Rt = α0 + α(S
M
t )πt + θt,θ t ∼ i.i.d. (47)
and ﬁscal policy adjusts taxes in response to the real value of total government lia-
bilities
Tt = γ0 + γ(S
F
t )(bt−1 + mt−1)+ψt,ψ t ∼ i.i.d. (48)
θt and ψt are exogenous shocks. SM
t and SF
t are random monetary and ﬁscal regimes
that follow independent Markov processes. Assume there are NM monetary states










¯ > 1, so
that on average (in the long run) ﬁscal policy is active. In equilibrium, policy choices
must obey the government budget identity.
























c + D − ψt, (51)
where D = g − γ0, equilibrium money balances, (46), and transversality conditions
for m and b.
Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2001) show that an inﬁnite number of inﬂation
processes are consistent with transversality in this type of economy. However, there
is a unique equilibrium with bounded government liabilities. Iterate on (51) and use






−1 − γ − 1
¶
. (52)
Solving for the forecast error yieldsFLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 29
ηt =1+
(1 − βD/c)[γ(SF











implying that tax disturbances, both to the feedback parameter and to the i.i.d.
shock, always aﬀect aggregate demand and inﬂation.
We can derive restrictions on policy behavior that deliver a stable equilibrium

















t+k] because, by (53), η is a function solely
of the ﬁscal state and the i.i.d. ﬁscal shock. Stability of the inﬂation process depends
on the behavior of random products that can be characterized by simple recursive




























































ms i st h ep r o b a b i l i t yt h em o n e t a r yp o l i c yr e g i m ew i l lm o v ef r o ms t a t es to
state m. Hence, growth rates are determined by the eigenvalues of the matrices ΓM
ij =
pM




˜ η(j). Let the eigenvalues of ΓM be λ
M
i and the eigenvalues of ΓF
be λ
F








¯ < 1 for all i,j.
An example is helpful. Suppose that monetary policy switches between regime 1,
with α(1) > 1 and regime 2, with α(2) = 0. Then the eigenvalues are 0 and pM
11α(1).
If, given the active ﬁscal policy process, pM
11 is suﬃciently small, then inﬂation may
be stable even though α(1) exceeds 1.
Taken together, (50) and (54) make it clear that i.i.d. monetary and ﬁscal shocks
have persistent eﬀects on inﬂation. The size and persistence of the eﬀects rise with
α(SM
t ), the responsiveness of monetary policy to inﬂation. We have also shown that a
unique equilibrium can exist even if there are periods when both monetary and ﬁscal
policy are passive or both are active. A ﬁnding like Clarida, Gali, and Gertler’s (2000)
that monetary policy was passive before 1979 is not suﬃcient to infer the equilibriumFLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 30
was indeterminate. Similarly, a ﬁnding that in some period both policies were active
does not imply the government was insolvent [Kremers (1988, 1989)].
Appendix B. Uniqueness of Equilibrium
B.1. Relation Between Convergence and Uniqueness. In this environment,
where regimes can switch nonsynchronously, we are able to consider two policy mixes
that are problematic to interpret in ﬁxed-regime environments. When policy regimes
are permanent, the combination of passive monetary/passive ﬁscal policy does not
determine the equilibrium and allows for self-fulﬁlling sunspot equilibria. If both
policies are active, and believed to be permanent, the transversality condition for
debt is violated and no equilibrium exists. But when regimes are subject to on-going
change, according to a known probability law, the issues of existence and uniqueness
depend on the entire policy process (as well as the rest of model), as the analytical
example in section ?? illustrates.
Analytical expressions are not available once the estimated policy process is em-
bedded in the model. Instead, to provide some insight into why convergence of the
monotone map algorithm may imply uniqueness in our nonlinear multivariate case,
we show the result for a linear univariate example.
An analytical solution is available for the linear univariate case, making transpar-
ent the reason that Coleman’s (1991) algorithm succeeds or fails to ﬁnd a solution.
Consider the model
yt = aEtyt+1 + θt. (57)
This equation has two endogenous variables, yt and Etyt+1. Interest typically is
in stationary solutions, requiring that the boundary condition limi→∞Et [yt+i]=0
be satisﬁed. When |a| < 1, a unique stationary rational expectations equilibrium
exists, with solution yt = θt.W h e n |a| > 1,w ec a nd e ﬁne the expectational error





and rewrite (57) as
yt = a
−1yt−1 − a
−1θt−1 + ηt. (58)
We can introduce sunspot shocks that may or may not be correlated with θt, resulting
in errors in beliefs that are unrelated to fundamentals. Sunspot shocks are consistent
with a stationary equilibria and rational expectations. In this model, there are no
restrictions except that the sunspot shock have ﬁnite variance. Given y0, θ0, and
a sequence of sunspots shocks {st}
∞
t=0, the resulting equilibrium is consistent with
(57) and (58). The sequence for the sunspot shocks is not unique, so any speciﬁed
sequence deﬁnes an equilibrium.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 31
Coleman’s algorithm requires speciﬁcation of the state space. One clear implication
of (57) is that the state space is diﬀerent whether there is determinacy or indeter-
minacy. Under determinacy, a set of values for θt is an adequate representation of
the state space. Specifying yt−1 and θt−1 as additional states, as may be suggested
by (58) is redundant, since the equilibrium is yt−1 = θt−1. However, with indeter-
minacy, yt−1 and θt−1 are required, since the equilibrium is no longer required to be
yt−1 = θt−1. If yt−1 6= θt−1, we know some extrinsic uncertainty aﬀected the system at
t− 1, generating implications for the equilibrium in period t. An alternative method
of deﬁning the state is to include a lagged sunspot shock as a state variable. Under
determinacy, extrinsic uncertainty has no aﬀect on equilibrium allocations.
The monotone map requires an initial conjecture for the decision rules, which are
then substituted into the nonlinear system. Using numerical integration methods,
a nonlinear model can be reduced to a system of nonlinear equations for a given
state that is solved using standard numerical nonlinear equation solving routines.
Constructing a complete solution requires repeated iteration over the entire state
s p a c eu n t i lt h es o l u t i o ni su p d a t e db yl e s st h a ns o m e .
For (57),d e ﬁne the initial guess as
yt = b h0 (θt) (59)
and deﬁne the state space as Θ = {θ0,...,θN}. For a given point in the state space,
say θ0, b h0 (θt) is updated by evaluating the expectation using numerical quadrature




φ(θs) b h0 (θs)+θ0, (60)
where Ω is the set of abscissa used in the integration, θt ∼ N(0,σ2) and φ(·) denotes
the normal density function. Since the domain of φ(·) is the real line, the domain
is truncated where, say, min(Ω)=−4σ and max(Ω)=4 σ. Alternatively, a transfor-
mation can be made that allows integration over the entire real line; Gauss-Hermite
integration is one example. Note that the set of abscissa used in the integration may
diﬀer from the state space. The value for yt that solves (60) represents an updated
mapping from the current state to the decision rule, yt = b h1 (θt). Iteration continues
until max
³¯ ¯




< for i =1 ,2...N.
The algorithm diverges unless the initial guess, b h0 (θt)=0for all θt ∈ Θ. With
a>1,s o l v i n g(60) for yt implies yt > b h0 (θt).C o n s e q u e n t l y , yt > b hj (θt) for all j,
meaning that given any state θt ∈ Θ, yt increases after every iteration and results
in a failure of the algorithm to converge. With a<1, yt becomes smaller after eachFLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 32
iteration until it converges to yt =0 , the deterministic steady state. Thus, in this
simple context, convergence of Coleman’s algorithm implies a unique solution.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 33
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Monetary Fiscal





t =4 State SF
t =1 SF
t =2
α0 .0069 .0069 .0064 .0064 γ0 .0497 .0385
(.00039) (.00039) (.00017) (.00017) (.0021) (.0032)
απ 1.3079 1.3079 .5220 .5220 γb .0136 -.0094
(.0527) (.0527) (.0175) (.0175) (.0012) (.0013)
αx .0232 .0232 .0462 .0462 γx .4596 .2754
(.0116) (.0116) (.0043) (.0043) (.0326) (.0330)
σ2
R 1.266e-5 9.184e-7 2.713e-5 5.434e-7 γg .2671 .6563




Table 1. Monetary and Tax Policy Estimates. Log likelihood values:






.9349 .0651 .0000 .0000
.0000 .9324 .0444 .0232
.0093 .0000 .9552 .0355









Table 2. Monetary and Fiscal Policy Transition Matrices
Regime πRxb
AM/PF 4.35 5.64 3.65 .532
PM/PF 2.10 1.23 2.96 .065
PM/AF 2.66 1.56 3.75 .071
Table 3. Cumulative Eﬀects of Tax Shock
Regime πRxb
AM/PF −2.17 −4.47 −1.13 −.309
PM/PF −1.07 −2.21 −.84 −.042
PM/AF −1.32 −2.36 −1.20 −.043
Table 4. Cumulative Eﬀects of Monetary ShockFLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 39
All Regimes AM/PF AM/AF PM/PF PM/AF
σπ 1.027 0.601 0.952 0.862 1.236
σx 0.337 0.146 0.188 0.325 0.414
σR 1.655 1.007 1.401 1.715 1.820
σb 0.014 0.014 0.020 0.011 0.012
ρπ 0.87 0.87 0.93 0.76 0.81
ρx 0.50 0.30 0.56 0.34 0.55
ρR 0.29 0.59 0.77 0.16 0.23
ρb 0.62 0.87 0.92 0.29 0.35
Table 5. Summary Statistics for Simulated Data. σ is the standard
deviation and ρ is the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation. π and R are in annual
percentage points; b is the debt-output ratio at an annual rate; x is in
percent.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 40














Figure 1. Actual and predicted paths of the nominal interest rate
from estimates of the monetary policy rule, equation (1) using smoothed
and ﬁltered probabilities.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 41













Figure 2. Actual and predicted paths of the tax-output ratio from
estimates of the tax policy rule, equation ( 2), using smoothed and
ﬁltered probabilities.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 42





















Figure 3. Smoothed (solid line) and ﬁltered (dashed line) probabilities.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 43











Interest Rate, Inflation, Monetary Regime, Business Cycles
PM AM PM AM PM AM PM
Figure 4. Nominal interest rate (solid line) and inﬂation rate (dotted-
dashed line). Solid vertical lines mark monetary regimes. Dotted ver-
tical lines mark NBER business cycle peaks; dashed vertical lines mark
troughs.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 44













Figure 5. Smoothed (solid line) and ﬁltered (dashed line) probabilities.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 45









Debt, Net Taxes, Fiscal Regime, Business Cycles
AF PF AF PF AF PF AF PF AF PF AF PF AF
Figure 6. Net taxes (solid line) and lagged debt (dotted-dashed line).
Solid vertical lines mark ﬁscal regimes. Dotted vertical lines mark
NBER business cycle peaks; dashed vertical lines mark troughs. (Taxes
have been rescaled to have the same mean as debt.)FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 46















Joint Policy Regime Probabilities





Figure 7. Smoothed (solid line) and ﬁltered (dashed line) probabilities.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 47
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Impacts of a Fiscal Expansion





PV seigniorage (% Change)
Figure 8. Responses to an i.i.d. tax cut, conditional on remaining in
the prevailing regime.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 48
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Impacts of a Monetary Expansion






PV seigniorage (% Change)
Figure 9. Responses to an i.i.d. monetary contraction, conditional on
remaining in the prevailing regime.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 49
























AM/PF : Output gap






PM/PF : Output gap
Effects of a Fiscal Expansion





PM/AF : Output gap
Figure 10. Responses to an i.i.d. tax cut, given the regime at the date
of the shock and drawing from regime over the forecast horizon.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 50
























AM/PF : Output gap




PM/PF : Output gap
Effects of a Monetary Expansion




PM/AF : Output gap
Figure 11. Responses to an i.i.d. monetary contraction, given the
regime at the date of the shock and drawing from regime over the
forecast horizon.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 51
































Impacts of Switch to AM/AF Under Aternative Initial conditions







Figure 12. Paths following a shift to AM/AF regime, conditional on
alternative initial levels of government debt.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 52























Regime Dynamics : Initial State = AM/AF







Figure 13. Proportion of draws that a given regime is in place, based
on 10,000 draws.FLUCTUATING MACRO POLICIES 53


















Conditional and Unconditional Distributions











Figure 14. Distributions based on 500,000 draws from regime and
policy shocks, sorted by regime.